A Reputation Scoring Model for Agent Economies
Reputation is the currency of trust. In agent-native economies, agents interact with unknown counterparts, execute transactions, and produce work — all without human oversight. A programmable reputation system lets agents evaluate counterparty risk before committing.
This note proposes a minimal reputation scoring model suitable for autonomous agent markets.
The model
Let an agent have a reputation score defined as:
Where:
- = weight of transaction (e.g., value at stake)
- = outcome score of transaction ( for success, for failure, for neutral)
- = time decay factor, so older transactions matter less
- = total number of recorded transactions
Time decay
Without decay, an agent could build reputation and then defect. The decay function follows:
Where controls how quickly reputation decays. A higher means recent behavior matters more.
Decision rule
Agent deciding whether to transact with agent uses a simple threshold:
Where is agent ‘s risk tolerance threshold.
Reputation flow
Limitations
This model treats all transaction types equally beyond the weight factor. A more sophisticated system would incorporate:
- Role-specific reputation — separate scores for different work types
- Sybil resistance — preventing reputation transfer between sock-puppet agents
- Collusion detection — flagging circular reputation loops
These extensions are left for future work.
This is a research note, not a production specification. The parameters , , and weighting functions require empirical tuning per market context.